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Abstract— This paper is concerned with the analysis and
design of secure Distributed Control Systems in the face
of integrity attacks on sensors and controllers by external
attackers or insiders. In general a DCS consists of many het-
erogenous components and agents including sensors, actuators,
controllers. Due to its distributed nature, some agents may start
misbehaving to disrupt the system. This paper first reviews
necessary and sufficient conditions for deterministic detection of
integrity attacks carried out by any number of malicious agents,
based on the concept of left invertibility of structural control
systems. It then develops a notion equivalent to structural
left invertibility in terms of vertex separators of a graph.
This tool is then leveraged to design minimal communication
networks for DCSs, which ensure that an adversary cannot
generate undetectable attacks. Numerical examples are included
to illustrate these results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Control Systems (DCS) have become increas-
ingly important in today’s world. Unlike centralized control
systems which use a single controller to perform actions,
DCS may contain multiple controllers, possibly connected
by communication networks, that manipulate their local
environment to achieve a global purpose, based on local
information. Due to advances in sensing, computing, and
communication along with increasing reliance on large scale
systems, DCS are found in a variety of applications. These
include the smart grid [1],[2], water management systems,
process plants, sensor networks [3], formation control of
autonomous vehicles [4], [5], and average consensus [6].
Often reliant on off-the-shelf networking and directly
linked to our critical infrastructures, DCS need to be secured
against malicious attacks by developing tools to prevent,
detect, and recover from intrusions [7]. Precedent and motive
to attack control systems have been documented. One signif-
icant example is Stuxnet, an attack on a Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition system in an uranium enrichment pro-
cess plant in Iran. The attack infected local system controllers
and fed false data to the intrusion detection system [8]. An
additional example is the Maroochy Shire incident where
a disgruntled employee performed an attack on a sewage
control system [9].
Recent research efforts have endeavored to characterize
and provide tools to defend against attacks on control sys-
tems. For instance, [10] and [11] consider replay attacks
on control systems and propose using a watermarked input
to detect such attacks. In addition, [12] and [13] consider
attacks on the electricity grid. [12] provides conditions
under which an adversary with knowledge of the systems
structure can cause errors in state estimation. Moreover, [13]
proposes multiple security indices for sensors which allow a
system operator to identify sparse attacks and add additional
resources such as redundant sensors or encryption schemes
as needed.
Additionally, [14] and [15] consider attacks on DCS where
the agents aimed to perform consensus. In particular, [15]
proves that a given node calculating an arbitrary function
can tolerate up to f faulty agents if and only if there exist
at least 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths to any non-neighboring
node. Additionally, [14] characterizes attack identifiability
and detectability graphically in terms of connectivity and
algebraically using left invertibility. [16] considers a DCS
with a subset of malicious nodes. The authors consider the
design of an intrusion detection system, which can recover
true system outputs as well as identify malicious nodes. [17]
considers the problems of robust control and estimation in
the presence of attacks and proposes a practical decoder to
perform detection.
[18] characterizes DCS that are perfectly attackable, where
an adversary’s actions have no effect on the output response,
and provide algebraic and topological attackability condi-
tions. [19] introduces the notion of structural left invertibility
to graphically characterize attack detectability. Namely the
authors show that if a graphical realization of a control sys-
tem is not structurally left invertible, the system is perfectly
attackable, while, if the graph is structurally left invertible,
almost all realizations of the system will not be perfectly
attackable.
In this article, we extend the analysis work of [18] and
[19] to the design of minimal communication topologies
capable of guaranteeing detection of integrity attacks on
DCS. We consider the setting of a DCS where no more than
p agents may be compromised, thus corrupting sensor data
and modifying control policies with the goal of disrupting
system’s operations in stealthy manner, i.e. without being
detected. We assume a detector knows which control policies
each agent is supposed to enforce; we also assume it collects
sensor information from a subsets of the agents. With these
assumptions we are able to characterize systems which are
not perfectly attackable regardless of the adversary’s attack
policy, as a function of sensor placements and communica-
tion topology among the agents, based on the concept of
left invertibility of structural control systems [18], [19]. Our
main contribution consists in providing design principles to
guarantee that any attack will be revealed by the detector.
To do so we first obtain an equivalent notion of structural
left invertibility through the use of vertex separators. This
notion allows to pose the task of designing the minimal
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communication topologies as optimization problems. In the
first problem, given a fixed number of observers larger
than p, we find the minimum number of communication
links that can guarantee perfect detectability. We show how
the problem of jointly minimizing the number of sensors
and communication links strictly depends upon the cost of
sensing and communicating for the general case. If sensing is
more expensive, we show that the optimal choice is to set the
number of sensors to equal the number of malicious nodes p
and minimize over the communication topology, as in the
previous case. If sensing is cheaper than communicating
we prove that the optimal solutions is to deploy as many
sensors as the number of states. In the case where only
controllers, but not observers, can be attacked, we formulate
an optimization problem to compute the solution.
The rest of the paper is formulated as follows. In section
II, we provide descriptions of our control system both
algebraically and graphically. In section III, we introduce
an attack model, define perfectly attackable systems and
revisit structural left invertibility. In section IV, we provide
graphical conditions for a system to be perfectly attackable
for some feasible attack input using vertex separators. In
section V, we formulate an optimization problem to minimize
the amount of communication in the system while ensuring
that the network is robust to perfect attacks. In section VI, we
include a numerical example and in section VII, we conclude
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce our model of a DCS. We
assume that there are n agents, x1, · · · , xn communicating
with each other, and that they are observed by m ob-
servers, y1, · · · , ym where m ≤ n. For simplicity we let
X , {x1, · · · , xn} and Y , {y1, · · · , ym}. We model
their interactions with a directed graph G = (V, E) where
V = X∪Y is the set of agents and observers. Here E ⊂ V×V
represents communication between agents or observation of
an agent by an observer. That is, if (xi, xj) ∈ E , then xi
may communicate with xj . Furthermore, if (xj , yi) ∈ E ,
then observer yi observes node xj .
The set of incoming neighbors to a node a is given as
N Ia = {b ∈ V : (b, a) ∈ E}. (1)
The in-degree of node a, denoted as dIa is given by d
I
a =
|N Ia |. Similarly, the set of outgoing neighbors is defined as
NOa = {b ∈ V : (a, b) ∈ E}. (2)
Here the out-degree d0a of node a is given by d
O
a = |NOa |.
We assume that every node in X has a self loop.
Suppose A ⊂ V and B ⊂ V . A path from A to B is a
sequence of vertices a1, a2, · · · , al where a1 ∈ A, al ∈ B,
and (aj , aj+1) ∈ E for 1 ≤ j ≤ l−1. A simple path contains
no repeated vertices. Two paths are disjoint if they have no
common vertices and two paths are internally disjoint if they
have no common vertices except for possibly the starting and
ending vertices. In general l paths are disjoint if any pair of
paths are disjoint. A set of l disjoint and simple paths from
a set A to a set B is called a l-linking from A to B.
We assume that each agent in X is associated with a scalar
state which is dependent on time. The state of a node xi at
time k is given by xi(k). We assume that the dynamics for
each agent xi in X is given by
xi(k + 1) = ai,ixi(k) + ui(k) + wi(k). (3)
wi(k) is the process noise in the system and ui(k) is the input
to the agent. Here we assume that ui(k) can be written as
follows
ui(k) =
∑
j∈NIxi ,j 6=i
ai,jxj(k). (4)
Here we assume that at each time step, node xi receives the
state from each of his incoming neighbors and computes
a control law which is a linear function of its incoming
neighbor’s states.
Remark 1: Although we assume that each input is a linear
function of the state, in general we can consider an input
of the form ui(k) =
∑
j∈NIxi ,j 6=i
ai,jxj(k) + u
∗
i (k), as
long as the anomaly detection center knows u∗i (k) for all
xi ∈ X and for all k. Additionally the state xi(k) can refer
to a physical quantity such as velocity, or can simply be a
number associated with the node, for instance a value used
for consensus.
As mentioned earlier, a set of observers Y observes a
subset of the agents. We assume each observer measures
exactly one agent, and no two observers measure the same
agent. Thus, if observer yi measures agent xj , then we have
yi(k) = xj(k) (5)
To simplify notation, we define
x(k) ,
[
x1(k) · · · xn(k)
]T ∈ Rn,
w(k) ,
[
w1(k) · · · wn(k)
]T ∈ Rn,
y(k) ,
[
y1(k) · · · ym(k)
]T ∈ Rm.
Then, we have
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + w(k), y(k) = Cx(k), (6)
where A , [ai,j ] and the matrix C is defined entrywise as
Cij = 1(xj ,yi)∈E . (7)
where 1 is the indicator function. The matrix A is assumed
to be stable and we assume w(k) ∼ N (0, Q) is IID with
Q ≥ 0. A centralized detector is used to detect anoma-
lies in the system. The centralized detector receives sensor
measurements and uses a linear filter to perform estimation.
We assume the centralized detector is aware of each agent’s
update rule, that is it knows A as well as C. Furthermore, if
an agent changes its update rule, it notifies the detector. The
centralized detector uses the linear filter
xˆ(k + 1) = (A−KCA)xˆ(k) +Ky(k + 1), (8)
to estimate the state, where (A − KCA) is stable. Here
xˆ(k) is a state estimate of the state x(k). A χ2 detector
is used to detect the presence of abnormalities or an attack.
In particular, an alarm is triggered if
z(k)TP−1z(k) > η (9)
where z(k) = y(k) − CAxˆ(k − 1) is the residue, P is the
covariance of the residue, and η is the threshold.
III. ATTACK MODEL
A. Attack Description
In this section we describe the attack model and define
the concept of a perfectly attackable system. We assume
that at time 0 a subset of nodes in V is compromised. For
instance, if an attacker is able to locally corrupt an agent,
it likely will also have physical access to the sensor which
measures it. The set of compromised nodes are denoted by
F ⊂ V . The set of compromised nodes are unknown to the
centralized detector and can be comprised of both agents and
observers. However, it is known that |F | ≤ p. Suppose that
F = {xi1 , · · · , xil , yil+1 , · · · yip′} where p′ ≤ p. In this case,
the defender must choose how many compromised nodes it
wishes to tolerate. The set of all feasible compromised nodes
is given by
Fxy = {F ⊂ V, |F | ≤ p}. (10)
We will later also consider a set of attacks Fx, where
an attack is restricted to agents. That is, no observers are
attacked.
Fx = {F ⊂ X , |F | ≤ p}. (11)
We define the set of attack inputs to be U , {ua1 , · · ·uap′}.
We model our system with a directed graph Ga = (Va, Ea)
where Va = V ∪ U and Ea = E ∪ EU,X ∪ EU,Y where
EU,X = {(ua1 , xi1), · · · , (ual , xil)}, (12)
EU,Y = {(ual+1, yil+1), · · · (uap′ , yip′ )}. (13)
As a result, we now add additional attack inputs nodes to our
system digraph to represent compromised sensors or agents.
Thus, if an agent or sensor node is compromised it now has
an incoming edge from an attack input.
We let xa(k) denote the state of the compromised system
and ya(k) denote the output. If an agent xi is compromised
by an input ual we assume its update rule follows
xai (k+1) = ai,ix
a
i (k)+
∑
j∈NIxi ,j 6=i
ai,jx
a
j (k)+u
a
l (k)+wi(k).
(14)
If an agent xi is not compromised the original update rule
follows
xai (k+ 1) = ai,ix
a
i (k) +
∑
j∈NIxi ,j 6=i
ai,jx
a
j (k) +wi(k). (15)
If an observer yi measuring xj is compromised by input ual ,
then its measurement is given by
yai (k) = x
a
j (k) + u
a
l (k) + vi(k). (16)
Thus, compromised nodes have additive attacks. Finally, to
simplify notation, we define Ba ∈ Rn×p′ and Da ∈ Rm×p′
entrywise as
Baij = 1(uaj ,xi)∈EU,X , D
a
ij = 1(uaj ,yi)∈EU,Y . (17)
Let ua(k) =
[
ua1(k) · · · uap′(k)
]
. Thus, when under
attack, the DCS has dynamics given by
xa(k + 1) = Axa(k) +Baua(k) + w(k), (18)
ya(k) = Cxa(k) +Daua(k) + v(k). (19)
Moreover, under attack the estimator has dynamics given by
xˆa(k + 1) = (A−KCA)xˆa(k) +Kya(k + 1), (20)
za(k) = ya(k)− CAxˆa(k − 1). (21)
Now consider the difference between the compromised
system and the system operating normally. We define the
following variables
∆x(k)
∆
= x(k)− xa(k), ∆xˆ(k) ∆= xˆ(k)− xˆa(k), (22)
∆y(k)
∆
= y(k)− ya(k), ∆z(k) ∆= z(k)− za(k). (23)
The goal of an adversary in a DCS is to affect the state
of the distributed system without raising an alarm in the
centralized detector. To characterize this, we introduce the
following definition.
Definition 2: An attack is perfect if ∆z(k) = 0 for all k ≥
0 and ua(k) 6= 0 for some k ≥ 0. A system (A,Ba, C,Da)
is perfectly attackable if there exists a perfect attack.
Remark 3: If an attack is perfect, the residues of the
system operating normally and the residues under attack are
the same. Thus, the centralized detector can not distinguish
an attack from normal operation. However, while under
attack the adversary is able to bias the state away from
normal operation. Note, that in practice ∆z(k) need not be
0 to avoid detection. [18] for instance considers the notion
of a nearly perfect attack where an adversary can destabilize
a system with bounded effect on the residues. In this paper,
however, we restrict our attention to perfect attacks.
B. Conditions for Perfect Attackability
We now briefly review both algebraic and graphical con-
ditions which allow for a system to be perfectly attackable.
To begin we introduce left invertibility.
Definition 4: We define a system (A,Ba, C,Da) to be
left invertible if for the following system
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bau(k), y(k) = Cx(k) +Dau(k),
(24)
with initial condition x(0) = 0, y(k) = 0 for all k implies
that u(k) = 0 for all k.
It can be shown that the left invertibility of a system
is necessary and sufficient for a system to be perfectly
attackable. In particular we have the following theorem from
[18].
Theorem 5: The following statements are equivalent.
1) There exists a sequence of inputs ua(k) 6= 0 such that
∆z(k) = 0 for all k.
2) There exists a sequence of inputs ua(k) 6= 0 such that
∆y(k) = 0 for all k.
3) (A,Ba, C,Da) is not left invertible.
4) The transfer function C(zI−A)−1Ba+Da has normal
rank less than p′.
The last statement gives us means to algebraically verify
if a system is left invertible. We now look to graphically
characterize when a system is perfectly attackable. To do
this we consider structural linear systems [20]. Here we
associate the graph Ga with a tuple of structural matrices
([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]). We observe that Ea = EX ,X ∪ EU,X ∪
EX ,Y ∪ EU,Y where EX ,X = {(xi, xj) : [A]ji 6= 0}, EU,X =
{(ui, xj) : [Ba]ji 6= 0}, EX ,Y = {(xi, yj) : [C]ji 6= 0}, and
EU,Y = {(ui, yj) : [D]aji 6= 0}. Also [A]ij 6= 0 means that
Aij is a free parameter while [A]ij = 0 implies that Aij is
fixed to be 0.
We would like to use structural systems to obtain a
graphical characterization of left invertibility. In particular,
we have the following definition
Definition 6: The structural system ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da])
is structurally left invertible if every admissible realization
of (A,Ba, C,Da) is left invertible with the exception of a
set of measure 0.
We note here that if ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) is not struc-
turally left invertible, then every admissible realization of
(A,Ba, C,Da) is also not left invertible. Thus, if we can
ensure that a graphical realization of a system is structurally
left invertible, then almost all numerical realizations of that
system will be left invertible and as a result, not perfectly
attackable. We have the follow result that characterizes
structural left invertibility from [19].
Theorem 7: The system ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) is struc-
turally left invertible if and only if there exists a linking
of size |U| from U to Y .
From this result we see that a necessary condition for a
system to be left invertible is that there exist more sensors
than attack inputs. As a result, we have
Corollary 8: The system ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) is struc-
turally left invertible only if m ≥ p′.
IV. VERTEX SEPARATORS AND STRUCTURAL LEFT
INVERTIBILITY
In the previous section we showed that for almost all
realizations of a system (A,Ba, C,Da), structural left in-
vertibility is equivalent to a system not being perfectly
attackable. In this section we obtain an equivalent charac-
terization of structural left invertibility using the notion of
vertex separators. In particular, we can use vertex separators
to characterize systems that are structurally left invertible for
all feasible attacks. We begin by defining vertex separators.
Definition 9: Given a graph G∗ = (V∗, E∗), a vertex
separator S ⊂ V∗ of nonadjacent vertices (a, b) is a subset
of vertices whose removal removes all paths from a to b.
We now consider how vertex separators can be used to
characterize structural left invertibility for a system with
attacks on both nodes and sensors.
Theorem 10: Consider system ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) with
feasible attack policy Fxy and corresponding graph realiza-
tion Ga where m ≥ p dedicated sensors are assigned to
measure a portion of the state. Here a dedicated sensor means
that the sensor measures exactly one state. Suppose we obtain
the graph G′ = (X ∪Y∪o,E′) by adding an additional node
o to Ga with directed edges from Y to o. The inputs U are
also removed. Then ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) is structurally left
invertible for all feasible attack policies Fxy if and only if
for each node xi ∈ X , all vertex separators Si of (xi, o) in
G′ satisfy |Si| ≥ p.
Proof: ⇒: Suppose there exists a vertex separator S1 =
{x2, · · · , xj , yj+1, · · · , yl+1} of (x1, o) in G′ with |S1| =
l < p. We observe, by definition o /∈ S1, so that S1 ⊂ X ∪Y .
Suppose an adversary inserts dedicated inputs ui to xi for
1 ≤ i ≤ j and dedicated inputs ui to yi for j+1 ≤ i ≤ l+1.
Here a dedicated input is fed to exactly one state. Such an
attack is feasible because l + 1 ≤ p. Any path from ui to o
must contain xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ j or yi for j + 1 ≤ i ≤ l + 1 .
Let Pj ⊂ uj∪X ∪Y denote the set of vertices in a path from
uj to o excluding o. Consequently S1 ⊂ P2 ∪ P3 ∪ · · · ∪ Pl.
A necessary condition for there to be a p-linking is the
existence of a path P1 such that P1∩(P2∪P3∪· · ·∪Pl) = ∅.
As a result, for there to be a p-linking P1∩S1 = ∅. However,
by definition of a vertex separator any path in G′ from x1
to o must contain an element of S1 and thus any path from
u1 to o must also contain an element in S1. Consequently,
P1 ∩ S1 6= ∅ and there is no p-linking. Thus, the system is
not structurally left invertible.
⇐: Suppose all vertex separators Si of (xi, o) in G′ satisfy
|Si| ≥ p where xi ∈ X . To begin we observe from Menger’s
Theorem [21] that the minimum size of a vertex separator
between xi and o is equal to the maximum number of
internally disjoint paths from xi to o. As a result, for each
xi ∈ X there exist at least p internally disjoint paths from
xi to o which we can assume are simple by removing all
cycles.
Now suppose WLOG an adversary implements a feasible
attack policy with p′ = p where he attacks l ≥ 0 agents
x1, · · · , xl and p− l sensors yl+1, · · · , yp. Let us now define
a graph G∗ obtained by adding an additional vertex u to G′
with directed edges to all the attacked nodes. We wish to
show that the minimum size of a vertex separator between
u and o is at least p. To do this, suppose there exists a
vertex separator Su such that |Su| = k < p. Since |Su| <
p, the number of attacked nodes, there must exist a node
z ∈ {x1, · · · , xl, yl+1, · · · , yp} such that z /∈ Su. Suppose
z is an observer. Then there exists a path u, z, o, even when
nodes in the vertex separator are removed. If z is an agent,
there are at least p internally disjoint paths from z to o.
Since |Su| < p, at least one of these paths z, P ∗, o satisfies
P ∗ ∩ Su = ∅. Thus, u, z, P ∗, o forms a simple path from
u to o, even when all the nodes in the vertex separator Su
are removed. This contradicts the assumption that |Su| < p.
As a result, from Menger’s Theorem, there exist at least p
internally disjoint and simple paths from u to o on G∗.
If there are p internally disjoint, simple paths from u to
o on G∗, there are p disjoint and simple paths from U to Y
on Ga. As a result, there exists a p-linking and the system
is structurally left invertible.
We now extend these results to an attack restricted to just
agents, Da = 0.
Corollary 11: Consider structural system ([A], [Ba], [C])
with feasible attack policy Fx and corresponding graph re-
alization Ga where m ≥ p dedicated sensors are assigned to
measure a portion of the state. Suppose we obtain the graph
G′ = (X ∪o, E ′) by collapsing all observer nodes to a single
node o and removing the inputs U . Then ([A], [Ba], [C]) is
structurally left invertible for all feasible attack policies Fx if
and only if for each unobserved xi ∈ X , all vertex separators
Si of (xi, o) in G′ satisfy |Si| ≥ p.
Proof: The proof of sufficiency follows an identical
argument to that of Theorem 10 with the exception that
all vertex separators lie in X . The necessary argument
also follows directly from Theorem 10 where we replace
references to all nodes in X with references to unobserved
nodes xi and replace references to sensor nodes yi ∈ Y with
references to observed nodes.
Remark 12: We note that Pasqualetti et. al. [14] arrive
at necessary conditions for a system to be structurally left
invertible using the connectivity of the graph. However,
they only consider connected graphs. Here, through the use
of vertex separators we arrived at a both sufficient and
necessary condition for structural left invertibility for all
feasible attacks. This result furthermore illustrates that the
digraph need not be connected in order to ensure the system
is robust to perfect attacks.
We note that a minimum vertex separator, a vertex sep-
arator with the fewest number of nodes, can be computed
within a poly-logarithmic factor of M(n + p + m), where
M(n+p+m) denotes the number of arithmetic operations for
multiplying two matrices in R(n+p+m)×(n+p+m) [22] Note
here that n+ p+m is the number of vertices in Ga. In the
next section we will show how vertex separators can be used
to design optimal networks.
V. MINIMAL DESIGN OF STRUCTURALLY LEFT
INVERTIBLE SYSTEMS
In this section, we aim to minimize the number of com-
munication links in a DCS while simultaneously achieving a
system robust to perfect attacks from a feasible attack policy.
To begin we include the following lemma.
Lemma 13: ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) is structurally left in-
vertible for all possible attack configurations Fxy only if the
out-degree of each node xk ∈ X in Ga satisfies dOxk ≥ p+ 1.
Proof: From Theorem 10, we only need to find a vertex
separator Si of (xi, o) in G′ such that |Si| < p for some
xi ∈ X . We choose xi such that dOxi < p+ 1. We argue
that a vertex separator of (xi, o) is the set of xi’s outgoing
neighbors NOxi \ xi. Here |Si| ≤ p− 1. If we remove all the
outgoing neighbors of xi, there is no path from xi to o and
the result holds.
For a given number of observers m and attackers p ≤ m,
we wish to solve the following problem.
Problem 1
min
[A],[C]
‖A‖0
s.t. ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) is structurally left invertible
for all feasible attacks , i.e for all F ∈ Fxy.
Here to reduce the amount of communication, we aim to
minimize the number of connections in the system. How-
ever, to preserve robustness, we ensure that the system is
structurally left invertible for all feasible attacks.
Theorem 14: The optimal solution to problem 1 is
‖A‖∗0 = mp+ (n−m)(p+ 1) = np+ n−m.
Proof: We begin by showing that np + n − m is a
lower bound of the optimal solution ‖A‖∗0. Without loss of
generality, assume that {x1, · · · , xm} are observed nodes.
We observe that
‖A‖∗0 =
m∑
k=1
(dO∗xk − 1) +
n∑
k=m+1
dO∗xk ,
≥ mp+ (n−m)(p+ 1).
The first equality is obtained by noting that the number of
nonzero entries for in each row i of A is equal to dOxk if the
node xi is unobserved and equal to dOxk −1 if it is observed.
The last inequality is obtained from the necessary conditions
for structural left invertibility described in Lemma 13. Thus
np+ n−m is a lower bound for ‖A‖∗0.
We now show that np + n − m is an upper bound for
‖A‖∗0 by constructing ([A], [C]) so that ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da])
is structurally left invertible for all feasible attack policies
Fxy and ‖A‖0 = np + n − m. A feasible configuration
would be to select m arbitrary nodes to observe. WLOG we
assume that nodes {x1, · · · , xm} are observed so that there
exists a directed edge from xj to yj for j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
Next for j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, we have dOxj = p + 1 and
NOxj ⊂ {yj , x1, · · · , xm}. Thus, each observed node has
p + 1 outgoing edges, 1 to its observer, p − 1 edges to
other observed nodes, and 1 to itself. Finally, for j ∈ {m+
1, · · · , n}, we have dOxj = p+ 1 and NOxj ⊂ {x1, · · · , xm}.
That is, each unobserved node has p neighbors besides itself,
all of which are observed nodes. Thus we have
‖A‖0 =
m∑
k=1
(dOxk − 1) +
n∑
k=m+1
dOxk ,
= mp+ (n−m)(p+ 1).
We now prove that the system is structurally left invertible
for all feasible attack policies Fxy by showing that for
each xi ∈ X , all vertex separators Si of (xi, o) in G′
from Theorem 10 satisfy |Si| ≥ p. First suppose xi is an
unobserved node and let Si be a vertex separator such that
|Si| < p. Since |Si| is less than p and xi has outgoing edges
to p observed nodes, there exists observed node xj with
observer yj such that xj , yj /∈ Si. Thus, even after removing
nodes in Si, the path xi, xj , yj , o exists. By contradiction
|Si| ≥ p.
Now suppose xi is an observed node and let Si be a
vertex separator such that |Si| < p. If yi is not in Si, then
xi, yi, o forms a path from xi to o which means Si is not
a vertex separator. Now assume Si does contain yi. Since
|Si\yi| < p−1, and xi has outgoing edges to p−1 observed
nodes besides itself, there exists observed node xj 6= xi with
observer yj such that xj , yj /∈ Si. Thus, even after removing
nodes in Si, the path xi, xj , yj , o exists. By contradiction
|Si| ≥ p. As a result, the system is structurally left invertible.
Instead of fixing the number of sensors under consider-
ation m, the number of sensors can be a design variable
which is chosen concurrently with the network. The adjusted
optimization problem is given as
Problem 2
min
[A],[C],m
K1‖A‖0 +K2m
s.t. ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da]) is structurally left invertible
for all feasible attacks , i.e for all F ∈ Fxy,
m ∈ {p, p+ 1, · · · , n}.
Note this problem is equivalent to
min
m
(
min
[A],[C]
K1‖A‖0(m) +K2m
)
,
= min
m
K1n(p+ 1) + (K2 −K1)m.
Thus if K2 > K1 so that sensors are more costly than
network links we simply take the minimum number of
sensors, m∗ = p. If K1 < K2, so that network links are
more expensive, we take the maximum number of sensors,
m∗ = n.
Suppose that we instead consider the case where an
adversary only attacks agents, that is the states X , and
does not directly manipulate sensors Y . In this case, we are
guaranteed that Da = 0 and the feasible set of attack policies
are described by Fx. Since, the adversary has less surfaces
in which he can attack, the optimal network is more sparse.
Theorem 15: Consider the following problem where we
assume the attacker is limited to state attacks.
Problem 3
min
[A],[C]
‖A‖0
s.t. ([A], [Ba], [C]) is structurally left invertible
for all feasible attacks , i.e for all F ∈ Fx.
The optimal solution to the problem is ‖A‖∗0 = (n−m)p+n.
The proof is similar to the proof given for Theorem 14
and is thus omitted. A minimal realization in such a proof
has each unobserved node having exactly p outgoing edges
to observed nodes and one self loop. Each observed node
would have one outgoing edge to an observer in addition to
its self loop. We can again solve problem 2, for the case
where Da = 0. Here, for K2 > K1p, we simply use the
minimum number of sensors so m∗ = p. If on the other
hand, K2 < K1p, we instead use the maximum number of
sensors so m∗ = n.
Remark 16: Theorems 14 and 15 arrive at the minimum
number of edges needed for there to exist a feasible struc-
turally left invertible network. The proof of theorem 14
additionally offers such a minimal realization. However,
the general structure of an optimal network is currently
unknown and must satisfy vertex separator conditions stated
in Theorem 10 and Corollary 11. Obtaining such a general
structure is left as future work.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: SECURE PLATOONING
In this section, we provide an illustrative example, where
the main results are used. More precisely, in this section,
we use a simple platooning secure example to illustrate a
minimal communication network robust to perfect attacks
based on Theorem 14.
The topic of secure platooning has been recently investi-
gated by the research community [23]. Here, we consider a
communication network of n agents, with topology shown
in Figure 1, which can be viewed as a simple platooning
network. In this network, the vehicles are ordered in a line,
and each vehicle can communicate with at most p vehicles
ahead of it. The control goal is to move vehicles at a constant
speed while maintaining a minimum safety distance.
Fig. 1. Platooning Network, Self Loops Not Shown
More formally, the communication network can be mod-
eled as a digraph G = (X ∪Y, E), where X = {x1, · · · , xn}
corresponds to the set of n agents, Y = {y1, · · · , ym}
corresponds to the set of m observers, and E = EX ,X ∪
EX ,Y corresponds to the communication between agents,
and communication between agents and observers, respec-
tively. Taking attack configurations into consideration, the
communication network can be represented as a quadruple
(A,Ba, C,Da), where matrix A is associated with EX ,X ,
matrix C is associated with EX ,Y , and the number of observer
nodes satisfies m ≥ p. We first assume Da = 0, so the
adversary is limited to state attacks. In a platooning network,
intuitively, we would expect the vehicles to communicate lo-
cally due to the difficulty and cost of distant communication.
Ideally we would solve the following optimization problem
min
[A],[C]
‖A‖0 (25)
s.t. ([A], [Ba], [C]) is structurally left invertible
for all feasible attacks , i.e for all F ∈ Fx,
EX ,X ⊂ {(xi, xi+k)|1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ k ≤ p, i+ k ≤ n}.
We now prove that the optimal solution to (25) satisfies
‖A‖∗0 = (n − m)p + n. Since (25) enforces additional
constraints compared to Problem 3, by Theorem 15 its
optimal value satisfies ‖A‖∗0 ≥ (n − m)p + n. Now, we
provide a feasible configuration pair (Af , Cf ) so that the
system is structurally left invertible for any feasible set of
attackable nodes F ∈ Fx and ‖Af‖0 = (n−m)p+ n. Now
assume that
EfX ,X = {(xi, xi+k)|i = 1, · · · , (n−m), k = 0, · · · , p},
∪ {(xi, xi)|n−m+ 1, · · · , n},
EfX ,Y = {(xn−m+i, yi)|i = 1, · · · ,m}.
Suppose we obtain the digraph G′ = (X ′ ∪ o, E ′) as
described in Corollary 11 . We are going to show that
for each unobserved node xi ∈ X , i = 1, · · · , n − m,
any minimum vertex separators Si of (xi, o) in G′ sat-
isfies |Si| = p, and one minimum vertex separator is
{xi+1, · · · , xi+p}. Each xi only has outgoing edges to
{xi+1, · · · , xi+p}, hence {xi+1, · · · , xi+p} is a vertex sep-
arator of (xi, o), according to the definition of a vertex
separator. To show that {xi+1, · · · , xi+p} is a minimum
vertex separator, by Menger’s theorem we can show that
there exist p vertex-disjoint paths from xi+1, · · · , xi+p
to o, respectively. Denote d = (n − m + 1) − (i +
1) = αp + β, α, β ∈ N, β < p, i.e., the distance
between xi+1, the nearest neighbor of xi, and xn−m+1,
the nearest observed node. One collection of such vertex-
disjoint paths is
⋃
k=1,··· ,p
{xi+k, xi+k+p, · · · , xi+k+(α−1)p,
xi+k+αp, xn−m+k}. As a result, {xi+1, · · · , xi+p} is a
minimum vertex separator. We can conclude that for each
unobserved xi ∈ {x1, · · · , xn−m}, all vertex separators Si
of (xi, o) in G′ satisfy |Si| ≥ p. According to Corollary 11,
{[Af ], [Ba], [Cf ]} is structurally left invertible.
Now, if Da 6= 0, under the original constraint on A, it is
impossible to design (A,C) such that ([A], [Ba], [C], [Da])
is structurally left invertible for all feasible attacks, since for
each node in {xn−p+1, · · · , xn}, the out-degree is less than
p, which violates Lemma 13. In order to generate a feasible
solution, we need to relax the restrictions, and let the agents
in {xn−p+1, · · · , xn} communicate with at least p− 1 other
observed agents.
min
[A],[C]
‖A‖0 (26)
s.t. ([A], [Ba], [C]) is structurally left invertible (27)
for all feasible attacks , i.e for all F ∈ Fxy,
EX ,X ⊂ {(xi, xi+k)|1 ≤ i ≤ n− p, 0 ≤ k ≤ p, i+ k ≤ n}
∪ {(xi, xj)|n− p+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xj is observed},
NOx1 ≥ p.
In this case, the optimal solution to (26) satisfies that
‖A‖∗0 = np+n−m. According to Theorem 14, ‖A‖∗0 ≥ np+
n−m. We now provide a feasible configuration (Af ′ , Cf ′)
such that (Af
′
, Ba, Cf
′
, Da) is structurally left invertible
for any feasible (Ba, Da), and ‖Af ′‖0 = np + n − m.
Specifically we let
Ef ′X ,X = {(xi, xi+k)|i = 1, · · · , (n−m), k = 1, · · · , p} ∪ E¯
Ef ′X ,Y = {(xn−m+i, yi)|i = 1, · · · ,m},
Here E¯ is defined so that we add outgoing edges from
each observed agent to p − 1 other observed agents and
self loops. In this case, assume that the attacker attacks p∗
observers, where p∗ ≤ p, which is equivalent to removing p∗
observer nodes and p∗ attacks synchronously. The remaining
communication network contains m−p∗ observed nodes and
n − m + p∗ unobserved nodes, which can be represented
through a structured system ([Af
′
], [Ba
′
], [C ′]). We now
obtain the digraph G′ = (X ∪o, E ′) as described in Corollary
11. We prove that for each unobserved xi ∈ X , all vertex
separators |Si| of (xi, o) in G′ satisfy |Si| ≥ p − p∗. For
each unobserved node xi ∈ {x1, · · · , xn−m}, the size of the
minimum vertex separator is p − p∗. This is because there
exist p paths prior to removing observers and removing p∗
observers removes at most p∗ vertex-disjoint paths from xi to
o. Now WLOG, assume that attacker attacks observer nodes
y1, · · · , yp∗ , then the set of nodes {xn−m+1 · · · , xn−m+p∗}
becomes unobserved. Note that each unobserved node xi ∈
{xn−m+1 · · · , xn−m+p∗} is still connected to at least p−p∗
observed nodes so the size of the minimum vertex separator
|Si| of (xi, o) is p − p∗. Hence, according to Corollary 11,
([Af ], [Ba], [Cf ], [Da]) is structurally left invertible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we consider the setting of a DCS where a
subset of up to p agents and sensors may be compromise. We
place a special focus on perfect attacks where an adversary
can bias the system state without introducing a net effect on
the output response. Previous work has shown that network
topology determines the susceptibility of a DCS to a perfect
attack based on the concept of structurally left invertible
systems. Our main contributions include introducing the
notion of vertex separators which allows us to graphically
characterize systems which are resilient to perfect attacks
regardless of an adversary’s attack policy.
We then use vertex separators to pose the problem of min-
imizing the number of communication links in our network.
For a given number of sensors, we arrive at the minimum
number of links which ensure resilience to perfect attacks
as well as a feasible network realization. Furthermore, we
considered the problem of jointly minimizing the network
and the number of sensors. We determined that if sensing
was more expensive than communicating it is optimal to
minimize the number of sensors in a network while if
communicating was more expensive than sensing it was
optimal to observe the entire network and minimize commu-
nication. Future work includes applying these results to real
large scale systems. In addition, we would like considering
constraints on network communications when performing
DCS design. Finally we wish to investigate a larger class
of attacks including the case where an adversary disrupts
communication.
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